Coverart for item
The Resource Voting for policy, not parties : how voters compensate for power sharing, Orit Kedar

Voting for policy, not parties : how voters compensate for power sharing, Orit Kedar

Label
Voting for policy, not parties : how voters compensate for power sharing
Title
Voting for policy, not parties
Title remainder
how voters compensate for power sharing
Statement of responsibility
Orit Kedar
Creator
Subject
Language
eng
Member of
http://library.link/vocab/creatorName
Kedar, Orit
Dewey number
324.9
Illustrations
illustrations
Index
index present
Literary form
non fiction
Nature of contents
  • dictionaries
  • bibliography
Series statement
Cambridge studies in comparative politics
http://library.link/vocab/subjectName
  • Voting
  • Political parties
  • Political planning
  • Representative government and representation
  • Public opinion
  • Comparative government
Label
Voting for policy, not parties : how voters compensate for power sharing, Orit Kedar
Instantiates
Publication
Antecedent source
unknown
Bibliography note
Includes bibliographical references and index
Color
multicolored
Contents
Voting for policy. Introduction: institutional sources of voter choice ; A theory of compensatory vote -- Empirical evidence: how voters compensate for diffusion of power. Compensatory vote in parliamentary democracies ; Balancing strong (and weak) presidents ; Compensatory vote in federations: evidence from Germany -- Theoretical implications
Control code
ocn593274268
Dimensions
unknown
Extent
1 online resource (xiv, 220 pages)
File format
unknown
Form of item
online
Isbn
9780511658389
Level of compression
unknown
Note
eBooks on EBSCOhost
Other physical details
illustrations
Quality assurance targets
not applicable
Reformatting quality
unknown
Sound
unknown sound
Specific material designation
remote
System control number
(OCoLC)593274268
Label
Voting for policy, not parties : how voters compensate for power sharing, Orit Kedar
Publication
Antecedent source
unknown
Bibliography note
Includes bibliographical references and index
Color
multicolored
Contents
Voting for policy. Introduction: institutional sources of voter choice ; A theory of compensatory vote -- Empirical evidence: how voters compensate for diffusion of power. Compensatory vote in parliamentary democracies ; Balancing strong (and weak) presidents ; Compensatory vote in federations: evidence from Germany -- Theoretical implications
Control code
ocn593274268
Dimensions
unknown
Extent
1 online resource (xiv, 220 pages)
File format
unknown
Form of item
online
Isbn
9780511658389
Level of compression
unknown
Note
eBooks on EBSCOhost
Other physical details
illustrations
Quality assurance targets
not applicable
Reformatting quality
unknown
Sound
unknown sound
Specific material designation
remote
System control number
(OCoLC)593274268

Library Locations

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