Coverart for item
The Resource Public choice analyses of American economic history, Volume 1, Joshua Hall, Marcus Witcher editors

Public choice analyses of American economic history, Volume 1, Joshua Hall, Marcus Witcher editors

Label
Public choice analyses of American economic history, Volume 1
Title
Public choice analyses of American economic history
Title number
Volume 1
Statement of responsibility
Joshua Hall, Marcus Witcher editors
Contributor
Subject
Language
eng
Summary
This book - the first of two volumes- looks at episodes in American economic history from a public choice perspective. Each chapter discusses citizens, special interests, and government officials responding to economic incentives in both markets and politics. In doing so, the book provides fresh insights into important periods of American history, from the Acadian expulsion in 1755 to the allocation of government grants during the New Deal. This volume features the work of prominent economic historians such as Dora Costa, John Wallis, and Jeremy Atack; well-known public choice scholars such as Jac Heckelman; and younger scholars such as Vincent Geloso and Philip Magness. This book will be useful for researchers and students interested in economics, history, political science, economic history, public choice, and political economy
Member of
Dewey number
330.973
Index
no index present
Literary form
non fiction
Nature of contents
  • dictionaries
  • bibliography
http://library.link/vocab/relatedWorkOrContributorName
  • Hall, Joshua,
  • Witcher, Marcus,
Series statement
Studies in public choice
Series volume
Volume 35
http://library.link/vocab/subjectName
United States
Label
Public choice analyses of American economic history, Volume 1, Joshua Hall, Marcus Witcher editors
Instantiates
Publication
Copyright
Antecedent source
unknown
Bibliography note
Includes bibliographical references
Color
multicolored
Contents
  • Intro; Acknowledgements; Contents; Contributors; 1 British Public Debt, the Acadian Expulsion and the American Revolution; 1.1 Introduction; 1.2 British Public Finance and the Burden of Empire; 1.3 The Acadian Upheaval; 1.4 A Public Choice Interpretation of the Policy Shift; 1.5 Conclusion; References; 2 North-South Alliances During the Drafting of the Constitution: The Costs of Compromise; 2.1 Introduction; 2.2 The Political Economy of Constitution Making; 2.3 The North-South Alliances at the 1787 Constitutional Convention; 2.3.1 Apportionment and Direct Taxation; 2.3.2 Election of Executive
  • 2.3.3 The Fugitive Slave Clause2.3.4 The Slave Trade Compromise; 2.3.5 Taxation of Exports and Imports; 2.3.6 Slave Importation; 2.3.7 Congressional Voting Rules for Commercial Regulations; 2.3.8 Analysis of the Slave Trade Compromise; 2.4 Conclusion; References; 3 A Paradox of Secessionism: The Political Economy of Slave Enforcement and the Union; 3.1 Introduction; 3.2 The Political Economy of Slavery; 3.3 What Lincoln's Election Meant for Slavery; 3.4 The Secessionist Impulse; 3.5 Creating a Slave-Based Security State; References
  • 4 Why Is There a Ratchet Effect? Evidence from Civil War Income Taxes4.1 Introduction; 4.2 The Ratchet Effect in the US Civil War; 4.2.1 The Crisis and Immediate Response; 4.2.2 The Process of Forming a Coalition; 4.2.3 The Civil War Income Tax of 1861; 4.2.4 The Civil War Income Tax of 1862; 4.2.5 Civil War Income Tax of 1864; 4.3 Civil War Income Tax Repeal, or What Happens After the Crisis?; 4.3.1 Manufacturers; 4.3.2 Farmers; 4.3.3 Financial Interests; 4.4 Interaction of the Three Groups; 4.5 Conclusion: Lessons From the Civil War Income Taxes; References
  • 5 Who Did Protective Legislation Protect? Evidence from 18805.1 Introduction; 5.2 The 1880 Census Sample; 5.3 Employee Opposition to Long Hours and the Length of the Working Day; 5.4 The Emergence of Protective Legislation; 5.5 Some Qualitative Evidence on Enforcement and the Impact of Hours Laws on Behavior; 5.6 Recent Debate Over Female Protective Legislation; 5.7 Protective Legislation and Hours of Work; 5.8 Impact of Hours Legislation in 1920 Compared with 1880; 5.9 Impact of Hours Legislation in 1880; 5.10 The Impact of Hours Legislation on Labor Force Composition
  • 5.11 Compliance and Protective Legislation5.12 Conclusion; References; 6 Political Selection of Federal Reserve Bank Cities; 6.1 Introduction; 6.2 Background; 6.3 Regression Analysis; 6.4 Conclusion; References; 7 Demand for Private and State-Provided Health Insurance in the 1910s: Evidence from California; 7.1 Introduction; 7.2 Private Health Insurance in 1918; 7.3 Debating State-Provided Health Insurance; 7.4 Voting on State-Provided Health Insurance; 7.5 Explaining the Defeat; 7.6 Concluding Remarks; References; 8 What Determines the Allocation of National Government Grants to the States?
Control code
on1030993330
Dimensions
unknown
Extent
1 online resource
File format
unknown
Form of item
online
Isbn
9783319775920
Level of compression
unknown
Note
SpringerLink
Quality assurance targets
not applicable
Reformatting quality
unknown
Sound
unknown sound
Specific material designation
remote
System control number
(OCoLC)1030993330
Label
Public choice analyses of American economic history, Volume 1, Joshua Hall, Marcus Witcher editors
Publication
Copyright
Antecedent source
unknown
Bibliography note
Includes bibliographical references
Color
multicolored
Contents
  • Intro; Acknowledgements; Contents; Contributors; 1 British Public Debt, the Acadian Expulsion and the American Revolution; 1.1 Introduction; 1.2 British Public Finance and the Burden of Empire; 1.3 The Acadian Upheaval; 1.4 A Public Choice Interpretation of the Policy Shift; 1.5 Conclusion; References; 2 North-South Alliances During the Drafting of the Constitution: The Costs of Compromise; 2.1 Introduction; 2.2 The Political Economy of Constitution Making; 2.3 The North-South Alliances at the 1787 Constitutional Convention; 2.3.1 Apportionment and Direct Taxation; 2.3.2 Election of Executive
  • 2.3.3 The Fugitive Slave Clause2.3.4 The Slave Trade Compromise; 2.3.5 Taxation of Exports and Imports; 2.3.6 Slave Importation; 2.3.7 Congressional Voting Rules for Commercial Regulations; 2.3.8 Analysis of the Slave Trade Compromise; 2.4 Conclusion; References; 3 A Paradox of Secessionism: The Political Economy of Slave Enforcement and the Union; 3.1 Introduction; 3.2 The Political Economy of Slavery; 3.3 What Lincoln's Election Meant for Slavery; 3.4 The Secessionist Impulse; 3.5 Creating a Slave-Based Security State; References
  • 4 Why Is There a Ratchet Effect? Evidence from Civil War Income Taxes4.1 Introduction; 4.2 The Ratchet Effect in the US Civil War; 4.2.1 The Crisis and Immediate Response; 4.2.2 The Process of Forming a Coalition; 4.2.3 The Civil War Income Tax of 1861; 4.2.4 The Civil War Income Tax of 1862; 4.2.5 Civil War Income Tax of 1864; 4.3 Civil War Income Tax Repeal, or What Happens After the Crisis?; 4.3.1 Manufacturers; 4.3.2 Farmers; 4.3.3 Financial Interests; 4.4 Interaction of the Three Groups; 4.5 Conclusion: Lessons From the Civil War Income Taxes; References
  • 5 Who Did Protective Legislation Protect? Evidence from 18805.1 Introduction; 5.2 The 1880 Census Sample; 5.3 Employee Opposition to Long Hours and the Length of the Working Day; 5.4 The Emergence of Protective Legislation; 5.5 Some Qualitative Evidence on Enforcement and the Impact of Hours Laws on Behavior; 5.6 Recent Debate Over Female Protective Legislation; 5.7 Protective Legislation and Hours of Work; 5.8 Impact of Hours Legislation in 1920 Compared with 1880; 5.9 Impact of Hours Legislation in 1880; 5.10 The Impact of Hours Legislation on Labor Force Composition
  • 5.11 Compliance and Protective Legislation5.12 Conclusion; References; 6 Political Selection of Federal Reserve Bank Cities; 6.1 Introduction; 6.2 Background; 6.3 Regression Analysis; 6.4 Conclusion; References; 7 Demand for Private and State-Provided Health Insurance in the 1910s: Evidence from California; 7.1 Introduction; 7.2 Private Health Insurance in 1918; 7.3 Debating State-Provided Health Insurance; 7.4 Voting on State-Provided Health Insurance; 7.5 Explaining the Defeat; 7.6 Concluding Remarks; References; 8 What Determines the Allocation of National Government Grants to the States?
Control code
on1030993330
Dimensions
unknown
Extent
1 online resource
File format
unknown
Form of item
online
Isbn
9783319775920
Level of compression
unknown
Note
SpringerLink
Quality assurance targets
not applicable
Reformatting quality
unknown
Sound
unknown sound
Specific material designation
remote
System control number
(OCoLC)1030993330

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