Coverart for item
The Resource Defending Husserl : a Plea in the Case of Wittgenstein & Company versus Phenomenology, (electronic resource)

Defending Husserl : a Plea in the Case of Wittgenstein & Company versus Phenomenology, (electronic resource)

Label
Defending Husserl : a Plea in the Case of Wittgenstein & Company versus Phenomenology
Title
Defending Husserl
Title remainder
a Plea in the Case of Wittgenstein & Company versus Phenomenology
Creator
Subject
Language
eng
Summary
The phenomenological approach to the philosophy of mind, as worked out by Husserl, has been severely criticized by philosophers within the Wittgensteinian tradition and, implicitly, by Wittgenstein himself. This book examines this criticism in detail, looking at the writings of Wittgenstein, Ryle, Hacker, Dennett, and others. In defending Husserl against his critics, it offers a comprehensive fresh view of phenomenology as a philosophy of mind
Member of
http://library.link/vocab/creatorName
Meixner, Uwe
Dewey number
128.33
Index
index present
Literary form
non fiction
Nature of contents
  • dictionaries
  • bibliography
Series statement
Philosophische Analyse / Philosophical Analysis
Series volume
v. 52
http://library.link/vocab/subjectName
  • Husserl, Edmund
  • Wittgenstein, Ludwig
  • Phenomenology
  • Philosophy of mind
Label
Defending Husserl : a Plea in the Case of Wittgenstein & Company versus Phenomenology, (electronic resource)
Instantiates
Publication
Note
IV. 8 Husserl and the Clash of the Four Giants
Antecedent source
unknown
Bibliography note
Includes bibliographical references (pages 493-499) and index
Color
multicolored
Contents
  • Preface: What is at Issue?; Remarks on the Method and the Manner of this Book; Chapter I: On Imagining; I.1 Ryle on imagining; I.2 Dennett (and Ryle) on imagining; I.3 Bennett & Hacker on imagining; I.4 Husserl on imagining; I.5 Wittgenstein (in contrast to Husserl) on imagining; Appendix to Chapter I: The German originals of the quotations from Husserl and Wittgenstein in Chapter I, and remarks on matters of translation; Chapter II: On Knowing the Inward Mental Life; II. 1 Against privatism and eliminativism; II. 2 Subjective and intersubjective knowledge of the inward mental life
  • II. 2.1 Ryle and Wittgenstein against introspection (reflexive experience)II. 2.2 Wittgenstein's argument against knowledge of the inward mental life; II. 2.3 Wittgenstein and Gorgias; II. 3 The true nature of consciousness, and its true epistemological consequences; II. 3.1 The root of Wittgensteinianism; II. 3.2 Knowing one's own mind and the minds of others; II. 4 Coda: the second-person point of view; Appendix to Chapter II: The German originals of the quotations from Husserl and Wittgenstein in Chapter II, and remarks on matters of translation; Chapter III: On Intending
  • III. 1 A prologue: epochéIII. 2 Technical intentionality-predicates; III. 3 The great divide in intentionality theory -- first part: Ryle (and Wittgenstein) versus Husserl; III. 3.1 Rylean Husserl and non-Rylean Husserl; III. 3.2 Does Husserl's theory of intentionality lead to idealism?; III. 4 The great divide in intentionality theory -- second part: Wittgenstein versus Husserl; III. 4.1 In corroboration of the thesis that Wittgenstein is an intentionality nihilist; III. 5 Dennett's nihilism regarding intentionality; III. 6 Bennett & Hacker's nihilism regarding intentionality
  • III. 7 The Wittgenstein-syndrome in the theory of intentionalityIII. 8 Wittgenstein's profundity; Appendix to Chapter III: The German originals of the quotations from Husserl and Wittgenstein in Chapter III, and remarks on matters of translation; Chapter IV: On the Literature; IV. 1 Husserl without introspection?; IV. 2 On the difficulty of saying the phenomenological truth in the best possible way; IV. 2.1 Thompson on reflexive (or reflective) experience, inner experience, introspection; IV. 2.2 Thompson on representationalism; IV. 2.3 Thompson on imagining; IV. 3 Was Husserl an externalist?
  • IV.4 Husserl's theory of intentionality misinterpretedIV.4.1 The Bell does not toll for Husserl's theory of intentionality; IV.5 Four views of a Wittgensteinian; IV.5.1 The first view (concerning introspection); IV.5.2 The second view (concerning Anscombe's mistranslation of "Vorstellung" and, allegedly, of "Bild"); IV.5.3 The third view (concerning the intentionality of imaginings; IV.5.4 The fourth view (concerning the ontological and epistemological status of imaginings); IV.6 Among the blind, the one-eyed is king; IV.7 Referentialism and anti-referentialism
Control code
ocn870590222
Dimensions
unknown
Extent
1 online resource (532 pages)
File format
unknown
Form of item
online
Isbn
9781306430425
Level of compression
unknown
Note
eBooks on EBSCOhost
Quality assurance targets
not applicable
Reformatting quality
unknown
Sound
unknown sound
Specific material designation
remote
System control number
(OCoLC)870590222
Label
Defending Husserl : a Plea in the Case of Wittgenstein & Company versus Phenomenology, (electronic resource)
Publication
Note
IV. 8 Husserl and the Clash of the Four Giants
Antecedent source
unknown
Bibliography note
Includes bibliographical references (pages 493-499) and index
Color
multicolored
Contents
  • Preface: What is at Issue?; Remarks on the Method and the Manner of this Book; Chapter I: On Imagining; I.1 Ryle on imagining; I.2 Dennett (and Ryle) on imagining; I.3 Bennett & Hacker on imagining; I.4 Husserl on imagining; I.5 Wittgenstein (in contrast to Husserl) on imagining; Appendix to Chapter I: The German originals of the quotations from Husserl and Wittgenstein in Chapter I, and remarks on matters of translation; Chapter II: On Knowing the Inward Mental Life; II. 1 Against privatism and eliminativism; II. 2 Subjective and intersubjective knowledge of the inward mental life
  • II. 2.1 Ryle and Wittgenstein against introspection (reflexive experience)II. 2.2 Wittgenstein's argument against knowledge of the inward mental life; II. 2.3 Wittgenstein and Gorgias; II. 3 The true nature of consciousness, and its true epistemological consequences; II. 3.1 The root of Wittgensteinianism; II. 3.2 Knowing one's own mind and the minds of others; II. 4 Coda: the second-person point of view; Appendix to Chapter II: The German originals of the quotations from Husserl and Wittgenstein in Chapter II, and remarks on matters of translation; Chapter III: On Intending
  • III. 1 A prologue: epochéIII. 2 Technical intentionality-predicates; III. 3 The great divide in intentionality theory -- first part: Ryle (and Wittgenstein) versus Husserl; III. 3.1 Rylean Husserl and non-Rylean Husserl; III. 3.2 Does Husserl's theory of intentionality lead to idealism?; III. 4 The great divide in intentionality theory -- second part: Wittgenstein versus Husserl; III. 4.1 In corroboration of the thesis that Wittgenstein is an intentionality nihilist; III. 5 Dennett's nihilism regarding intentionality; III. 6 Bennett & Hacker's nihilism regarding intentionality
  • III. 7 The Wittgenstein-syndrome in the theory of intentionalityIII. 8 Wittgenstein's profundity; Appendix to Chapter III: The German originals of the quotations from Husserl and Wittgenstein in Chapter III, and remarks on matters of translation; Chapter IV: On the Literature; IV. 1 Husserl without introspection?; IV. 2 On the difficulty of saying the phenomenological truth in the best possible way; IV. 2.1 Thompson on reflexive (or reflective) experience, inner experience, introspection; IV. 2.2 Thompson on representationalism; IV. 2.3 Thompson on imagining; IV. 3 Was Husserl an externalist?
  • IV.4 Husserl's theory of intentionality misinterpretedIV.4.1 The Bell does not toll for Husserl's theory of intentionality; IV.5 Four views of a Wittgensteinian; IV.5.1 The first view (concerning introspection); IV.5.2 The second view (concerning Anscombe's mistranslation of "Vorstellung" and, allegedly, of "Bild"); IV.5.3 The third view (concerning the intentionality of imaginings; IV.5.4 The fourth view (concerning the ontological and epistemological status of imaginings); IV.6 Among the blind, the one-eyed is king; IV.7 Referentialism and anti-referentialism
Control code
ocn870590222
Dimensions
unknown
Extent
1 online resource (532 pages)
File format
unknown
Form of item
online
Isbn
9781306430425
Level of compression
unknown
Note
eBooks on EBSCOhost
Quality assurance targets
not applicable
Reformatting quality
unknown
Sound
unknown sound
Specific material designation
remote
System control number
(OCoLC)870590222

Library Locations

    • InternetBorrow it
      Albany, Auckland, 0632, NZ
Processing Feedback ...