Coverart for item
The Resource Being in time : dynamical models of phenomenal experience, edited by Shimon Edelman, Tomer Fekete, Neta Zach, (electronic resource)

Being in time : dynamical models of phenomenal experience, edited by Shimon Edelman, Tomer Fekete, Neta Zach, (electronic resource)

Label
Being in time : dynamical models of phenomenal experience
Title
Being in time
Title remainder
dynamical models of phenomenal experience
Statement of responsibility
edited by Shimon Edelman, Tomer Fekete, Neta Zach
Contributor
Subject
Language
eng
Summary
Given that a representational system's phenomenal experience must be intrinsic to it and must therefore arise from its own temporal dynamics, consciousness is best understood -- indeed, can only be understood -- as being in time. Despite that, it is still acceptable for theories of consciousness to be summarily exempted from addressing the temporality of phenomenal experience. The chapters comprising this book represent a collective attempt on the part of their authors to redress this aberration. The diverse treatments of phenomenal consciousness range in their methodology from philosophy, throu
Member of
Dewey number
153
Index
index present
Literary form
non fiction
Nature of contents
  • dictionaries
  • bibliography
http://library.link/vocab/relatedWorkOrContributorName
  • Edelman, Shimon
  • Fekete, Tomer
  • Zach, Neta
Series statement
Advances in consciousness research
Series volume
88
http://library.link/vocab/subjectName
  • Phenomenological psychology
  • Experience
  • Consciousness
  • Time
Label
Being in time : dynamical models of phenomenal experience, edited by Shimon Edelman, Tomer Fekete, Neta Zach, (electronic resource)
Instantiates
Publication
Antecedent source
unknown
Bibliography note
Includes bibliographical references and index
Color
multicolored
Contents
  • Being in Time; Editorial page; Title page; LCC data; Table of contents; Introduction; Conclusion; Time after time; 1. Introduction: Ubiquitous time; 2. A middle way: Dynamical systems; 3. Brainspace; 4. Temporality now!; 5. Countdown to implementation; 6. Crossing the explanatory gap; Acknowledgements; References; Neuronal reflections and subjective awareness; 1. Introduction- the optimistic outlook; 2. The creative nature of visual perception; 3. A colossal library; 4. Building templates- hierarchically; 5. A combinatorial explosion; 6. The ambiguity inherent in isolated responses
  • 7. Neuronal reflections8. Experimental consequences; 9. What is so unique about the cerebral cortex?; 10. Is consciousness a local or global phenomenon?; 11. Is visual awareness dependent on higher levels of the cortical hierarchy?; References; From probabilities to percepts; 1. Introduction; 2. The ubiquity of sensory ambiguity and its absence from sensory consciousness; 3. An orthogonal order of estimates and the 'precedence of the gaze'; 4. Design features of a global best estimate buffer; 4.1 The neural numerology of sensory experience
  • 4.2 Our panoramic, nested, ego-centric, three-dimensional visual world4.3 "Just in time" for the next gaze movement: brief career of the global best estimate; 5. Cortex, colliculus and "the other thalamus"; 6. Conclusion; References; Being in time; 1. A few more constraints on theories of phenomenal experience; 1.1 Autonomy; 1.2 Timeliness; 1.3 Computational tractability; 2. Implications of the autonomy of experience; 3. Time is of the essence; 4. Waiting for Godot; 4.1 The attractor hypothesis; 4.2 The way ahead; 5. Computational tools for distributed dynamic coordination; 6. Summary
  • AcknowledgmentsReferences; The (lack of) mental life of some machines; 1. Introduction -- special laws:; 2. One bit at a time; 3. How detailed is detailed enough?; 4. Not all machines are born equal; 5. Conclusion; Acknowledgements; References; Restless minds, wandering brains; 1. Introduction; 1.1 Escaping robustness; 2. Perceptual switching; 3. An EEG-study of perceptual mind wandering; 4. The dynamics of mind-wandering; 5. What happens to the laminar intervals when observers do engage in a task?; 6. Conclusion; Acknowledgement; References; Fuzzy consciousness; 1. Introduction
  • 2. Cylinder sets3. The pushing and pulling of consciousness; 4. Discussion; References; Two dynamical themes in Husserl; 1. Background; 2. Horizon theory/constitution; 3. Transcendental-eidetic phenomenology; 4. Conclusion; References; Desiderata for a mereotopological theory of consciousness; 1. Introduction: Unity, holism, and temporal continuity; 2. Mereotopology as a new tool for the study of consciousness; 2. A critical application: Does an experience have temporal parts?; 3. "Self-embedding": Sketch of a positive proposal; 4. Conclusion; References; The brain and its states
Control code
ocn797918086
Dimensions
unknown
Extent
1 online resource
File format
unknown
Form of item
online
Isbn
9789027273598
Level of compression
unknown
Note
eBooks on EBSCOhost
Quality assurance targets
not applicable
Reformatting quality
unknown
Sound
unknown sound
Specific material designation
remote
System control number
(OCoLC)797918086
Label
Being in time : dynamical models of phenomenal experience, edited by Shimon Edelman, Tomer Fekete, Neta Zach, (electronic resource)
Publication
Antecedent source
unknown
Bibliography note
Includes bibliographical references and index
Color
multicolored
Contents
  • Being in Time; Editorial page; Title page; LCC data; Table of contents; Introduction; Conclusion; Time after time; 1. Introduction: Ubiquitous time; 2. A middle way: Dynamical systems; 3. Brainspace; 4. Temporality now!; 5. Countdown to implementation; 6. Crossing the explanatory gap; Acknowledgements; References; Neuronal reflections and subjective awareness; 1. Introduction- the optimistic outlook; 2. The creative nature of visual perception; 3. A colossal library; 4. Building templates- hierarchically; 5. A combinatorial explosion; 6. The ambiguity inherent in isolated responses
  • 7. Neuronal reflections8. Experimental consequences; 9. What is so unique about the cerebral cortex?; 10. Is consciousness a local or global phenomenon?; 11. Is visual awareness dependent on higher levels of the cortical hierarchy?; References; From probabilities to percepts; 1. Introduction; 2. The ubiquity of sensory ambiguity and its absence from sensory consciousness; 3. An orthogonal order of estimates and the 'precedence of the gaze'; 4. Design features of a global best estimate buffer; 4.1 The neural numerology of sensory experience
  • 4.2 Our panoramic, nested, ego-centric, three-dimensional visual world4.3 "Just in time" for the next gaze movement: brief career of the global best estimate; 5. Cortex, colliculus and "the other thalamus"; 6. Conclusion; References; Being in time; 1. A few more constraints on theories of phenomenal experience; 1.1 Autonomy; 1.2 Timeliness; 1.3 Computational tractability; 2. Implications of the autonomy of experience; 3. Time is of the essence; 4. Waiting for Godot; 4.1 The attractor hypothesis; 4.2 The way ahead; 5. Computational tools for distributed dynamic coordination; 6. Summary
  • AcknowledgmentsReferences; The (lack of) mental life of some machines; 1. Introduction -- special laws:; 2. One bit at a time; 3. How detailed is detailed enough?; 4. Not all machines are born equal; 5. Conclusion; Acknowledgements; References; Restless minds, wandering brains; 1. Introduction; 1.1 Escaping robustness; 2. Perceptual switching; 3. An EEG-study of perceptual mind wandering; 4. The dynamics of mind-wandering; 5. What happens to the laminar intervals when observers do engage in a task?; 6. Conclusion; Acknowledgement; References; Fuzzy consciousness; 1. Introduction
  • 2. Cylinder sets3. The pushing and pulling of consciousness; 4. Discussion; References; Two dynamical themes in Husserl; 1. Background; 2. Horizon theory/constitution; 3. Transcendental-eidetic phenomenology; 4. Conclusion; References; Desiderata for a mereotopological theory of consciousness; 1. Introduction: Unity, holism, and temporal continuity; 2. Mereotopology as a new tool for the study of consciousness; 2. A critical application: Does an experience have temporal parts?; 3. "Self-embedding": Sketch of a positive proposal; 4. Conclusion; References; The brain and its states
Control code
ocn797918086
Dimensions
unknown
Extent
1 online resource
File format
unknown
Form of item
online
Isbn
9789027273598
Level of compression
unknown
Note
eBooks on EBSCOhost
Quality assurance targets
not applicable
Reformatting quality
unknown
Sound
unknown sound
Specific material designation
remote
System control number
(OCoLC)797918086

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