Coverart for item
The Resource Bankers, bureaucrats, and central bank politics : the myth of neutrality, Christopher Adolph

Bankers, bureaucrats, and central bank politics : the myth of neutrality, Christopher Adolph

Label
Bankers, bureaucrats, and central bank politics : the myth of neutrality
Title
Bankers, bureaucrats, and central bank politics
Title remainder
the myth of neutrality
Statement of responsibility
Christopher Adolph
Creator
Subject
Language
eng
Summary
"Most studies of the political economy of money focus on the laws protecting central banks from government interference; this book turns to the overlooked people who actually make monetary policy decisions. Using formal theory and statistical evidence from dozens of central banks across the developed and developing worlds, this book shows that monetary policy agents are not all the same. Molded by specific professional and sectoral backgrounds and driven by career concerns, central bankers with different career trajectories choose predictably different monetary policies. These differences undermine the widespread belief that central bank independence is a neutral solution for macroeconomic management. Instead, through careful selection and retention of central bankers, partisan governments can and do influence monetary policy - preserving a political trade-off between inflation and real economic performance even in an age of legally independent central banks."--Provided by publisher
Member of
http://library.link/vocab/creatorDate
1976-
http://library.link/vocab/creatorName
Adolph, Christopher
Dewey number
332.1/1
Illustrations
illustrations
Index
index present
Literary form
non fiction
Nature of contents
  • dictionaries
  • bibliography
Series statement
Cambridge series in comparative politics
http://library.link/vocab/subjectName
  • Monetary policy
  • Banks and banking, Central
  • Bureaucracy
Label
Bankers, bureaucrats, and central bank politics : the myth of neutrality, Christopher Adolph
Instantiates
Publication
Antecedent source
unknown
Bibliography note
Includes bibliographical references (pages 319-342) and index
Color
multicolored
Contents
  • 6.
  • How central bankers use their independence
  • 7.
  • Partisan governments, labor unions, and monetary policy
  • 8.
  • The politics of central banker appointment
  • 9.
  • The politics of central banker tenure
  • 10.
  • Conclusion: The Dilemma of Discretion
  • 1.
  • Agents, institutions, and the political economy of performance
  • 3.
  • Central banker careers and inflation in industrial democracies
  • 4.
  • Careers and monetary policy process
  • 5.
  • Careers and inflation in developing countries
Control code
ocn844940155
Dimensions
unknown
Extent
1 online resource (xxiii, 357 pages)
File format
unknown
Form of item
online
Isbn
9781139616812
Level of compression
unknown
Note
eBooks on EBSCOhost
Other physical details
illustrations
Quality assurance targets
not applicable
Reformatting quality
unknown
Sound
unknown sound
Specific material designation
remote
System control number
(OCoLC)844940155
Label
Bankers, bureaucrats, and central bank politics : the myth of neutrality, Christopher Adolph
Publication
Antecedent source
unknown
Bibliography note
Includes bibliographical references (pages 319-342) and index
Color
multicolored
Contents
  • 6.
  • How central bankers use their independence
  • 7.
  • Partisan governments, labor unions, and monetary policy
  • 8.
  • The politics of central banker appointment
  • 9.
  • The politics of central banker tenure
  • 10.
  • Conclusion: The Dilemma of Discretion
  • 1.
  • Agents, institutions, and the political economy of performance
  • 3.
  • Central banker careers and inflation in industrial democracies
  • 4.
  • Careers and monetary policy process
  • 5.
  • Careers and inflation in developing countries
Control code
ocn844940155
Dimensions
unknown
Extent
1 online resource (xxiii, 357 pages)
File format
unknown
Form of item
online
Isbn
9781139616812
Level of compression
unknown
Note
eBooks on EBSCOhost
Other physical details
illustrations
Quality assurance targets
not applicable
Reformatting quality
unknown
Sound
unknown sound
Specific material designation
remote
System control number
(OCoLC)844940155

Library Locations

    • InternetBorrow it
      Albany, Auckland, 0632, NZ
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